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Implementing Privacy Policy: Who 
Should Do What? 
David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic* 
Academic scholarship on privacy has focused on the 
substantive rules and policies governing the protection of personal 
data. An extensive literature has debated alternative approaches 
for defining how private and public institutions can collect and use 
information about individuals. But, the attention given to the what 
of U.S. privacy regulation has overshadowed consideration of how 
and by whom privacy policy should be formulated and 
implemented. 
U.S. privacy policy is an amalgam of activity by a myriad of 
federal, state, and local government agencies. But, the quality of 
substantive privacy law depends greatly on which agency or 
agencies are running the show. Unfortunately, such 
implementation-related matters have been discounted or ignored—
with the clear implication that they only need to be addressed after 
the “real” work of developing substantive privacy rules is 
completed. 
 
*  David A. Hyman is a Professor at Georgetown University Law Center. From 2001–
2004, he served as Special Counsel to the Federal Trade Commission. William E. 
Kovacic is the Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy at the George 
Washington University Law School. He served as General Counsel at the FTC from 
2001–2004, and was a Commissioner from 2006 to 2011, chairing the agency from 
March 2008 to March 2009. He currently is a Non-Executive Director of the United 
Kingdom’s Competition and Markets Authority. The views expressed herein are the 
authors’ alone. 
We received exceptionally helpful comments from Bob Gellman when this paper was 
presented at the 10th Annual Privacy Law Scholars Conference (May 2017). We also 
want to acknowledge the helpful comments we received from other attendees at the 
conference, including Aaron Burstein, Pam Dixon, Sharon Bradford Franklin, Zachary 
Goldman, David Gray, Lance Hoffman, Chris Hoofnagle, Cam Kerry, Siona Listokin, 
Bill McGeveran, Joanne McNabb, Terrell McSweeny, Whitney Merrill, Hannah Meyer, 
Ira Rubenstein, Jay Stanley, Peter Swire, and Omer Tene. 
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As things stand, the development and implementation of U.S. 
privacy policy is compromised by the murky allocation of 
responsibilities and authority among federal, state, and local 
governmental entities—compounded by the inevitable tensions 
associated with the large number of entities that are active in this 
regulatory space. These deficiencies have had major adverse 
consequences, both domestically and internationally. Without 
substantial upgrades of institutions and infrastructure, privacy law 
and policy will continue to fall short of what it could (and should) 
achieve. 
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“The world’s most valuable resource is no longer 
oil, but data.”1 
 
“In the ‘20s and ‘30s it was the role of government. 
‘50s and ‘60s it was civil rights. 
The next two decades are going to be privacy.”2 
 
INTRODUCTION 
For the past few decades, academics, government officials, and 
practitioners have debated the merits of privacy law and policy.3  
Most of the debate has focused on the substantive rules and 
policies that dictate how private and public institutions can collect 
and use information about individuals. Various commentators have 
offered frameworks, templates, and design principles for 
developing an optimal set of privacy rules.4  The most popular 
approach appears to be codifying and extending existing 
substantive law by adopting an omnibus federal privacy statute—
although there is considerable disagreement on the details of what 
such a statute should include.5 
 
1 The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, ECONOMIST (May 
6, 2017), http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21721656-data-economy-demands-
new-approach-antitrust-rules-worlds-most-valuable-resource [https://perma.cc/52PK-
9LGL]. 
2 The West Wing: The Short List (NBC television broadcast Nov. 24, 1999). 
3 The legal systems that control the collection and use of information about 
individuals are sometimes called privacy law and sometimes called data protection. In 
this paper, we use the term “privacy” to encompass both ideas. See Woodrow Hartzog & 
Daniel J. Solove, The Scope and Potential of FTC Data Protection, 83 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 2230, 2235 (2015). We define what we mean by privacy law and the institutions 
that carry out privacy functions below. See discussion infra Part II. 
4 See generally Dan Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy 
Protection, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 352; ROBERT GELLMAN, FAIR INFORMATION PRACTICES: 
A BASIC HISTORY (2017), https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V2YV-8DE3]. 
5 See, e.g., Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World: A Framework For 
Protecting Privacy and Promoting Innovation in the Global Digital Economy, WHITE 
HOUSE (2012), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/privacy-final.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D68Q-VHCT]. 
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This emphasis on policy substance has overshadowed issues of 
administrative implementation—a problem that is certainly not 
unique to privacy policy.6  That said, even casual observers of the 
U.S. system know that a bewildering assortment of federal, state, 
and local governmental entities are active in the privacy policy 
space. The hodgepodge of involved institutions deserves close 
attention, for the quality of substantive privacy policy depends 
greatly on which agency (or agencies) run the show. 
In the past fifteen years or so, academics, government officials, 
and practitioners have devoted more attention to implementation 
issues.7  Some scholars have examined how the Federal Trade 
Commission (“FTC”) has become the closest U.S. equivalent to a 
national privacy authority—a status owing both to historical 
accident and to the FTC’s conscious efforts to occupy a significant 
un-colonized policy space.8  Others have considered how the 
 
6 On the gap between the adoption of policy reforms and their successful sustained 
implementation, see ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER 
MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED 155 (2008) (“[W]hat is required to initiate policy 
reform should not be confused with what is required to sustain it.”) (emphasis in 
original); GRAHAM T. ALLISON, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE CUBAN MISSILE 
CRISIS 267–68 (1971) (“If analysts and operators are to increase their ability to achieve 
desired policy outcomes . . . we shall have to find ways of thinking harder about the 
problem of ‘implementation,’ that is, the path between the preferred solution and actual 
performance of the government.”). See also David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, 
Competition Agencies with Complex Portfolios: Divide or Conquer?, CONCURRENCES 
REV. NO. 1-2013, ART NO. 50967, 1-2 (2013), https://www.concurrences.com
/en/review/issues/no-1-2013/conferences/competition-agencies-with-complex-policy-
portfolios-divide-or-conquer-chicago (“The specific amalgamation of policy tasks within 
a single government body has important consequences for how competition agencies 
define their goals, allocate resources, and select programs to fulfill their duties. The 
assignment of multiple regulatory tasks can deeply affect a competition agency’s 
performance, just as it affects the performance of other agencies. This issue has attracted 
little attention in competition policy circles, although public administration scholars (and, 
to a far more limited extent, legal academics) have done important work on such issues in 
other areas.”). 
7 See, e.g., Symposium, Enforcing Privacy Rights, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751 (2003) 
(collecting various papers on privacy policy implementation). Commentators before this 
period expressed concern with the adequacy of implementing institutions for privacy 
policy. But, our perception is that the attention to implementation has increased 
significantly in the more recent era. 
8 See, e.g., CHRIS JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND 
POLICY 26–35 (2016); Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at 2232; see generally Daniel J. 
Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 
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development and enforcement of privacy policy should be 
allocated among federal agencies and across state governments.9  
Another line of commentary has compared U.S. privacy 
institutions to their counterparts abroad.10 
In this paper, we build upon these contributions, and consider 
the optimal agency design with which to form and implement U.S. 
privacy policy. Despite important achievements, the existing 
configuration of implementing institutions leaves much to be 
desired. Authority over privacy is simultaneously murky and 
subdivided among multiple entities at the federal (i.e., the FTC and 
sector specific regulators), state, and local levels. The resulting 
dynamics (both horizontal and vertical) create considerable inter-
agency tension and inconsistency. 
In our experience at the FTC and working in Europe, we have 
seen that these institutional deficiencies have at least two distinct 
adverse consequences. First, the institutional status quo 
undermines the ability of the United States to develop coherent 
substantive privacy policy. Outwardly, the many public bodies at 
the national and state levels with privacy-related duties profess a 
common commitment to work collegially toward the development 
of sound privacy policies. To some extent, the expressed spirit of 
common cause is genuine, and it routinely manifests itself in 
helpful forms of policy coordination and enforcement cooperation. 
At the same time, in our roles inside and outside the government, 
we have observed a distressing tendency of participants to seek 
 
COLUM. L. REV. 583 (2014). See also Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data 
and the Future for Privacy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON DIGITAL 
TRANSFORMATIONS 21 (F. Xavier Olleros & Majlinda Zhegu eds., 2016) (noting the 
FTC’s “entrepreneurial expansion of its jurisdiction” regarding privacy). 
9 See generally Danielle Keats Citron, The Privacy Policymaking of State Attorneys 
General, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747 (2016); Peter Swire, Why the Federal Government 
Should Have a Privacy Policy Office, 10 J. TELECOM. & HIGH TECH. L. 41 (2012) 
[hereinafter Swire, Privacy Policy Office]; Peter Swire, No Cop on the Beat: 
Underenforcement in E-Commerce and Cybercrime, 7 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 
107 (2009); Robert Gellman, A Better Way to Approach Privacy Policy in the United 
States: Establish a Non-Regulatory Privacy Protection Board, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1183 
(2003). 
10 See generally William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 959 (2016); Paul M. Schwarz, The E.U.-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to 
Institutions and Procedures, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1966 (2013). 
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policymaking pre-eminence as an end in itself.11 This 
(unfortunately quite predictable) impulse impedes the emergence 
of a privacy regime that exploits the benefits of institutional 
diversity and experimentation while also achieving needed levels 
of coherence. 
The second adverse consequence involves the capacity of the 
United States to effectively participate in the formulation of global 
privacy standards. Our domestic institutional weaknesses hinder 
efforts by the U.S. government to encourage the development of 
superior international privacy standards and to achieve needed 
levels of cross-border cooperation in law enforcement.12  At 
present, the European Union is the dominant influence in setting 
privacy standards that govern behavior by firms engaged in trans-
Atlantic trade and, to a significant degree, in global commerce.13  
The General Data Protection Regulation, which took effect in May 
2018, is simply the latest manifestation of the EU’s preeminent 
role in setting international policy standards.14  In pressing ahead 
with their own reforms, officials within the European Commission 
and the EU’s member state data protection authorities often take a 
 
11 Most readers will be shocked to discover that this is going on. See CASABLANCA 
(Warner Bros. Productions 1942) (“I’m shocked—shocked—to find that gambling is 
going on in here.”). 
12 See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at 2271 (noting that a “more centralized and 
comprehensive approach to data protection is sorely needed in the United States, which is 
increasingly at odds with most other countries in the world with its more fragmented 
sectoral approach to data protection.”).  Hartzog and Solove describe U.S. privacy law as 
“a fragmented mess of overlapping and inconsistent laws that make it nearly impossible 
for consumers to figure out how their privacy is protected.” Id. at 2273. This situation 
weakens the “soft power” that the U.S. government would otherwise have in this policy 
space. See id. 
13 See Sheera Frenkel, Tech Giants Brace for Europe’s New Privacy Rules, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 28, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/28/technology/europe-data-privacy-
rules.html [https://perma.cc/4UXC-H8DT] (describing the European Union’s influence 
over information technology companies operating in Europe and in the United States). 
14 Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 
2018 on the Protection of Natural Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data 
and on the Free Movement of Such data, and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General 
Data Protection Regulation), 2018 O.J. (L. 119) 66. See generally Ozan Karaduman, The 
General Data Protection Regulation: Achieving Compliance for EU and Non-EU 
Companies, 18 BUS. L. INT’L 225 (2017) (describing the General Data Protection 
Regulation). 
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dismissive approach to the U.S. privacy regime, and discount U.S. 
preferences regarding the optimal structure of privacy rules.15 
The dismissive attitude of EU officials toward the U.S. partly 
derives from the EU’s hope that it will be accepted as the world’s 
foremost privacy regulator. One of us (Kovacic) has participated in 
many events in which European privacy officials lament the 
weakness of the U.S. system and assert that the U.S. regime is 
toothless. Recitals about the U.S. enforcement record—including 
cases prosecuted and fines collected—comes as a surprise, and 
occasionally seems to inspire a reconsideration of the inadequacy 
narrative. But come the next international meeting, and many of 
the same European officials will repeat the inadequacy narrative, 
and assert that the U.S. privacy regime is a paper tiger. Given these 
dynamics, it is not entirely clear how we should go about getting 
EU officials to take U.S. privacy regulation seriously, short of a 
complete transplant of the E.U. system (including its definition of 
privacy as a fundamental human right). 
That said, one obvious strategy is for the U.S. to address the 
fragmented and convoluted framework of its domestic regulation 
of privacy. Foreign officials are understandably perplexed by the 
mélange of federal and state institutions—compounded by the 
patchwork of sector specific controls and the absence of any 
hierarchy of authority that would give one institution the “last 
word” on policy formation. We have seen the exasperation of 
foreign officials who fruitlessly seek clarity about who is in 
charge. 
This state of affairs undermines U.S. efforts to shape the 
framework of global privacy standards. Until we improve policy 
coordination and establish a clear line of authority and 
responsibility, the U.S. will witness a further decline in its capacity 
to shape global privacy policy—which, at least in the technology 
sector, is arguably the single most important form of economic 
regulation currently in play. In sum, we believe reform of the 
 
15 The basis for this observation consists of conversations that one of us (Kovacic) has 
had with EU officials during his tenure as an FTC Commissioner (2006–11) and in 
subsequent meetings as a non-executive director of the United Kingdom’s Competition 
and Markets Authority from 2013 to the present. 
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existing institutional arrangements are a necessary component if 
we want to improve substantive privacy policy—both at home, and 
in the effective participation of the U.S. in the formulation of 
global privacy standards. 
In previous work, we explore the design of competition 
agencies and other regulatory bodies.16  We draw upon this work to 
consider the future of privacy policy implementation in the U.S. To 
focus our discussion of institutional options, we assume that the 
U.S. will eventually undertake a fundamental retooling of 
substantive privacy policy—which seems likely to take the form of 
an omnibus privacy law that consolidates, restates, and extends 
existing federal privacy commands. But, as policymakers devise an 
omnibus privacy law, they should also simultaneously adjust the 
institutional arrangements through which the new substantive 
privacy framework will be administered. Indeed, even if an 
omnibus privacy statute is not adopted, there is considerable value 
in upgrading the mechanism for implementing and extending 
existing privacy mandates.17 
We begin by describing the array of policy functions that fit 
under the privacy umbrella and identifying some of the principal 
public institutions that carry out these functions. We then set out 
seven criteria for judging the performance of the entities 
implementing U.S. privacy policy and for determining the optimal 
allocation of tasks to implementing institutions. We use this 
framework to propose several ways in which the U.S. should retool 
policy development and law enforcement in the privacy space. We 
present several options that will increase the coherence and 
effectiveness of the U.S. privacy system and enhance the influence 
of the U.S. in the development of international privacy policy. We 
focus chiefly on whether the FTC, with an enhanced mandate, 
 
16 See generally David A. Hyman & William E. Kovacic, Why Who Does What 
Matters: Governmental Design and Agency Performance, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1446 
(2014); Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 6. 
17 See, e.g., Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at 2271 (noting that the “chances of 
Congress passing a comprehensive federal data protection law are remote. The most 
practical way that the U.S. data protection regime will evolve into something more 
coherent and comprehensive is through FTC enforcement.”) 
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should serve as the national privacy regulator, or whether a new 
dedicated privacy regulator should be created. 
We conclude that the optimal strategy is to enhance the FTC’s 
role, by eliminating gaps in its jurisdiction and expanding its 
capacity to promote cooperation among agencies with privacy 
portfolios. We expect that these steps will help rationalize privacy 
policy enforcement and encourage convergence on superior policy 
norms. 
Our proposal for an enlarged FTC role focuses on two 
dimensions of privacy regulation. The first is what might be called 
the “consumer-facing” elements of a privacy. Our analysis deals 
mainly with the relationship between consumers and enterprises 
(for-profit firms and not-for-profit institutions, such as universities) 
that provide them with goods and services. The second dimension 
involves the privacy of individuals as employees. Here we are 
concerned with laws and regulations that control what information 
employers can collect about their employees, and how such 
information can be distributed within the organization and shared 
with other bodies.18 
We do not address the legal mechanisms that protect privacy 
where the actors are government institutions. Thus, we do not 
examine the appropriate framework for devising and implementing 
policies that govern data collection and record-keeping 
responsibilities of federal agencies.19 We also do not address 
privacy questions that arise when government agencies conduct 
surveillance for national security purposes. We set aside these 
issues for another day, and we recognize there will be a continued, 
significant role for privacy policy makers in governmental entities 
other than the FTC. Thus, our suggestions for an expanded FTC 
 
18 In discussions with foreign governments about the EU-US Safe Harbor Privacy 
Principles, the FTC has taken the position that Section five of the FTC Act permits the 
agency to control transfers of data involving employees. This position is not easily 
reconciled with traditional interpretations that view the FTC Act as protecting the 
interests of individuals as consumers. See Hoofnagle, supra note 8, at 321–25 (describing 
the operation of the Safe Harbor mechanism). See Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and 
Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUSTON L. REV. 719, 738–46 (2001) (describing the 
soundness of the FTC’s authority to enforce the Safe Harbor commitments). 
19 At the federal level, the modern statutory foundation for privacy requirements that 
govern federal agencies is the Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 
1126        FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXIX:1117 
role with respect to consumer-facing privacy matters would leave 
in place the framework of controls that address other privacy 
concerns. Nonetheless, our proposal does contemplate stronger 
mechanisms to ensure policy consultation and coordination among 
governmental entities with privacy mandates—whether consumer-
facing or not. 
In addressing these issues, we generally do not take on the 
substance of U.S. privacy law. Our emphasis upon the benefits of 
system-wide coherence and effectiveness applies without regard to 
the specific privacy directives that our nation chooses to adopt. 
Thus, we do not address the debate over whether the conceptual 
foundation for privacy protection should be fair information 
practice principles (“FIPPs”),20 a consequences-based theory of 
liability,21 or some amalgam or these or other approaches. Of 
course, our views do reflect a judgment about which considerations 
ought to be taken into account in formulating substantive 
requirements. To the extent readers have different views or 
priorities, they may well reach different conclusions than we do 
about the optimal design of implementing institutions. Stated 
differently, your mileage (and preferred vehicle for getting to the 
destination) may vary. 
I. U.S. PRIVACY POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Privacy law in the United States is a stark example of a 
“regulatory thicket.”22  We focus on two aspects of the regulatory 
thicket: the collection of substantive commands that fall within the 
 
20 See Department of Commerce Internet Policy Task Force, COMMERCIAL DATA 
PRIVACY AND INNOVATION IN THE INTERNET ECONOMY: A DYNAMIC POLICY FRAMEWORK 
3–5, 23–30 (Dec. 2010) (describing FIPPs); see also COLIN J. BENNETT, REGULATING 
PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 
101–11 (1992) (describing “core fair information principles”); GELLMAN, supra note 4, at 
23. 
21 See J. Howard Beales III & Timothy J. Muris, Choice or Consequences: Protecting 
Privacy in Commercial Information, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 109, 118–120 (2008) (presenting 
privacy policy approach based on proof of adverse consequences to consumers). 
22 See Paul Ohm & Blake Reid, Regulating Software When Everything Has Software, 
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1672, 1674, 1696–97 (2016) (applying the concept of a 
“regulatory thicket” to describe public regulation of software). 
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ambit of privacy regulation and the myriad public institutions 
responsible for formulating and implementing privacy policy. 
A. Privacy Law Commands: Functions and Forms 
Privacy laws in the United States perform two basic functions. 
One set of controls seeks to restrict the collection and use of 
information about individuals.23  For commercial transactions, 
these controls define the circumstances under which service 
providers can (a) collect information about their customers; (b) 
retain and use such information; and (c) transfer customer 
information to third parties.24  Another set of controls establishes 
the conditions under which bodies such as credit rating services 
can assemble and use data on consumers.25 
A second core function is to ensure that information about 
consumers is adequately protected from unauthorized use.26  Some 
privacy laws require commercial bodies to establish safeguards 
against inadvertent disclosure of consumer information.27  Others 
punish those who misappropriate consumer information to steal an 
individual’s identify or property or damage an individual’s 
reputation.28  A further category of controls prohibits unauthorized 
access to data systems for the purpose of stealing sensitive data or 
disabling a data network.29 
 
23 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 491–547 
(2006) (examining controls on the collection and use of information as elements of 
privacy policy). 
24 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, PRIVACY LAW FUNDAMENTALS 39–54 
(2015) (describing the framework of controls). 
25 See generally HOOFNAGLE, supra note 8, at 268–305 (discussing legislation and 
controls that have impacted financial data privacy). 
26 See id. at 216–35 (discussing the FTC’s standards for information security). 
27 See generally American Bar Association, Antitrust Law, in CONSUMER PROTECTION 
LAW DEVELOPMENTS 138–39 (2009) (describing legal obligations that require firms to 
safeguard consumer information). 
28 See generally Daniel J. Solove, Identity Theft, Privacy, and the Architecture of 
Vulnerability, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1246 (2003) (providing a review of protections against 
identity theft). 
29 See generally Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1561 (2010) (describing laws governing unauthorized 
access to computer databases). 
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A complex “jumble” of federal and state statutes seek to 
perform these functions.30 Unlike a number of other countries, the 
United States has no omnibus federal privacy law.31  Federal 
privacy law is a mosaic of controls that apply to specific categories 
of activity; to specific sectors; and to specific classes of 
individuals.32 The most scalable element of the federal privacy 
regime—the prohibition in the Federal Trade Commission Act 
against “unfair or deceptive acts and practices” (UDAP)33—is 
circumscribed by jurisdictional exclusions involving banks, 
common carriers, and not-for-profit institutions.34  Nor does the 
FTC have responsibility to oversee data collection and protection 
by public institutions; a separate body of laws governs the duties of 
public agencies.35  Finally, many elements of federal privacy law 
are enforceable with civil remedies only; other laws involving 
practices such as identity theft and hacking of computer systems 
are punishable as criminal offenses.36 
State law and policy provide a major second dimension in U.S. 
privacy law.37  The contributions of states, in many respects, equal 
or surpass the work of federal institutions in determining the 
privacy obligations of commercial actors. One impressive 
illustration of the significance of state policy making is the field of 
 
30 Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at 2267. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012). 
34 The scope of these exemptions is a regularly litigated matter. See generally F.T.C. v. 
AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993 (9th Cir. 2016) (interpreting scope of common 
carrier exemption). There are also frequently-expressed concerns about the FTC’s 
authority to act to protect the interests of foreign citizens and thus to provide assurance to 
other jurisdictions (notably, the European Union) that their citizens are adequately 
protected when data about them is transferred to the United States. See Gellman, supra 
note 9, at 1213–14. 
35 See ALAN CHARLES RAUL, PRIVACY AND THE DIGITAL STATE: BALANCING PUBLIC 
INFORMATION AND PERSONAL PRIVACY 23–31 (2002) (describing the Privacy Act and 
other controls on the collection and use of information by public bodies). 
36 See generally Stuart F. H. Allison et al., Exploring the Crime of Identity Theft: 
Prevalence, Clearance Rates, and Victim/Offender Characteristics, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 19 
(2005) (discussing the civil and criminal regimes for the prosecution of identity theft). On 
the criminal sanctions for unauthorized access to computer databases, see generally Kerr, 
supra note 29. 
37 See generally Citron, supra note 9 (providing a comprehensive examination of the 
role of state law and policy in privacy). 
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data breach and notification legislation. At least forty-five states 
have enacted laws that require firms to notify individuals when an 
unauthorized disclosure of consumer information has taken place.38 
In this and other areas of privacy policy, state governments 
have played an important role in devising and testing various forms 
of privacy controls. For example, any listing of the most important 
sources of privacy law in the United States would have to include 
the State of California.39  Measured by its power to shape national 
privacy norms, California deserves a place in any discussion of 
which institution determines privacy policy in the United States. If 
policymaking significance were the only criterion for selection 
(putting aside matters of protocols governing international 
relations), California might well be included (along with the FTC 
or other federal bodies) in the delegation that represents the United 
States in international gatherings of privacy officials.40 
B. The Ecology of U.S. Privacy Institutions 
An elaborate array of public bodies is responsible for 
formulating and implementing privacy policy. Institutional 
multiplicity, with concurrent or overlapping grants of authority, is 
a routine feature of the U.S. system.41  But privacy law is an 
especially interesting case, due to the exceptional variety of public 
institutions that occupy some part of the policymaking and law 
enforcement space.42  Privacy stands out for study not just because 
of the complexity of the U.S. system considered in isolation, but 
 
38 See Gregory James Evans, Regulating Data Practices: How State Laws Can Shore 
Up the FTC’s Authority to Regulate Data Breaches, Privacy, and More, 67 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 187, 203, 203 n.93 (2015). 
39 On California’s central role as a privacy regulator, see Citron, supra note 9, at 762. 
40    Indeed, one could reasonably argue that California has an active foreign policy 
portfolio—and not just on privacy.  See David Freeman Engstrom & Jeremy M. 
Weinstein, What if California Had A Foreign Policy? The New Frontier of States’ Rights, 
41 WASH. Q. 27 (2018) (“[Governor Jerry] “Brown eagerly positioned California at the 
forefront of global efforts to confront climate change. . . Because California prides itself 
on its global reach, the idea of a distinctively Californian foreign policy has been kicking 
around for a while.”)   
41 See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 6, at 9. 
42 For a discussion of the complexity of the regulatory framework for privacy policy in 
the United States, see supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text. 
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also by comparison to many foreign privacy regimes, which use far 
fewer institutions to implement substantive privacy law. 
Below, we sketch out the regulatory ecosystem for the 
implementation of domestic privacy policy. We use the term 
“ecosystem” to capture several distinctive features of the U.S. 
regime.43  One element is the extraordinary diversity of 
institutional species/entities. A large number of these institutions 
have developed programs and processes for devising privacy 
policy and enforcing privacy legal commands.44  A careful 
understanding of what each institution does, and knowledge of 
how it evolved, should precede decisions to uproot individual 
species, or to introduce new species into the ecosystem. 
A second element of the privacy ecosystem is a relatively rapid 
adaptability that flourishes through a process of decentralized 
decision making and does not depend on central direction as a 
predicate for policy development. Despite the lack of an omnibus 
privacy law, institutions at the national and state levels have 
adjusted over time to the emergence of new commercial 
phenomena and to rapid technological change.45 
The myriad of privacy institutions are in key respects, 
interdependent. The effectiveness of the entire system of privacy 
controls depends on how well each institution accounts for these 
interdependencies. Through formal and informal means, the public 
agency participants in privacy regulation have formed mechanisms 
to coordinate their operations. Imperfect though it is, coordination 
has facilitated the development of common principles, and has 
reduced the smash-ups that one might expect from a multi-level 
 
43 See supra notes 23–28 and accompanying text (describing the “regulatory 
ecosystem” of the federal government). In fairness, our ecosystem metaphor obscures the 
degree of “intelligent design” in the system, as well as the extent to which dumb luck 
plays a role. See, e.g., SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 1783–1917, at 413 (1927) (“Prince Bismarck is said to have remarked, just before 
his death, that there was a special providence for drunkards, fools, and the United States 
of America.”).  
44 See supra notes 23–28 (describing the “regulatory ecosystem” of the federal 
government).  
45 See, e.g., David C. Vladeck, Charting the Course: The Federal Trade Commission’s 
Second Hundred Years, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 2101, 2102–11 (2015) (describing the 
modern evolution of FTC’s role in developing privacy policy standards). 
2019] IMPLEMENTING PRIVACY POLICY 1131 
regulatory regime with so many actors. Decisions about the 
redesign of institutions—such as by uprooting one regulator’s 
duties and assigning them to another—should account for the 
operation and effectiveness of networks and policy synapses that 
may not be readily visible. 
Federal agencies. The most important federal privacy 
institution is the FTC, which has become the leading U.S. privacy 
body.46  At present, the FTC is responsible for three distinct policy 
fields: competition, consumer protection, and privacy (which is 
situated within the agency’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, but 
has acquired its own identity and prominence).47 The 
Commission’s privacy work is grounded partly in laws that, in 
whole or in part, are specifically designed as privacy measures. 
These include early measures, such as the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (“FCRA”)48 and more recent enactments such as the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act49 and the Children’s Online Privacy Protection 
Act (“COPPA”).50  The FTC has built an extensive “common law” 
of privacy protection through settlements in cases brought pursuant 
to its UDAP mandate.51 
Most privacy scholars regard this process of common law 
elaboration as a useful approach,52 but this view is not universally 
accepted.53 The FTC has also used its rulemaking authority to 
 
46 See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 8, at 192 (“The Federal Trade Commission has 
emerged as the nation’s top regulator of privacy.”); Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at 
2267 (“In the current U.S. privacy regulatory system, the FTC has grown into the role of 
being the leading regulator of privacy . . .”). 
47 For a discussion on the ascent of privacy as a distinct focus of FTC policymaking 
and on the possibilities for future elaboration of the Commission’s role in this field, see 
Hoofnagle, supra note 8; Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3; Vladeck, supra note 44, at 
2102–11 
48 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012). 
49 15 U.S.C. §§ 6804–05 (2012). 
50 15 U.S.C. § 6505 (2012). 
51 The FTC is not alone in using the administrative process to build legal norms. See 
Justin Hurwitz, Data Security and the FTC’s UnCommon Law, 101 IOWA L. REV. 955, 
958 (2016). 
52 Positive assessments include Solove & Hartzog, supra note 8, and HOOFNAGLE, 
supra note 8. 
53 For a negative assessment of the FTC’s contributions to privacy policy, see Robert 
Gellman, Can Consumers Trust the FTC to Protect Their Privacy?, ACLU (Oct. 25, 
2016), http://www.aclu.org/blog/free-future/can-consumers-trust-ftc-protect-their-privacy 
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build important elements of the national privacy architecture, 
including the Do-Not-Call rule, which was promulgated pursuant 
to the Telemarketing Sales Act. 
Some critics view the FTC’s privacy program as a barrier to 
the adoption of an improved privacy regime. One of us (Kovacic) 
attended a privacy conference as an FTC official, and was 
approached by a privacy advocate who condemned the FTC and its 
use of UDAP authority to address privacy issues. The advocate 
argued that the FTC’s UDAP cases had created the illusion of 
effective law enforcement and had given the business community a 
useful argument to blunt demands for legislation that would 
dramatically upgrade the U.S. privacy framework. Only if the FTC 
stood down, he said, would the serious inadequacies of the status 
quo be revealed, and the necessary support for needed reforms 
materialize. 
The FTC also has important “soft power” tools with which to 
set privacy policy.54  The FTC can examine industry trends by 
compelling companies to provide information. The FTC can also 
conduct studies, hold hearings, and prepare reports—a power it has 
used to examine privacy-related matters.55 The FTC has also 
played a major role as a convener of conferences, workshops, and 
seminars that have served to identify significant commercial trends 
and focus debate on key privacy issues.56 
 
[https://perma.cc/UNV9-EGU9] (“[T]he FTC deserves low grades when it comes to 
protecting consumer privacy.”). 
54 See Adam D. Thierer, Ryan Hagemann, and Jennifer Skees, Soft Law for Hard 
Problems: The Governance of Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future, COLO. 
TECH. L. J. (forthcoming 2019); see also William E. Kovacic, The Digital Broadband 
Migration and the Federal Trade Commission: Building the Competition and Consumer 
Protection Agency of the Future, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1, 2–3 (2010). 
55 See, e.g., Protecting Consumer Privacy and Security, FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy/ftc-
privacy-report [https://perma.cc/4QHA-6SLC] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019); see also Edith 
Ramirez,  Chairwoman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Protecting Privacy in the Era of Big Data, 
Remarks at the International Conference on Big Data from a Privacy Perspective (Hong 
Kong, June 10, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/06/protecting-
privacy-era-big-data-remarks-ftc-chairwoman-edith-ramirez [https://perma.cc/3E43-
8SXK]. 
56 See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Agenda for 
PrivacyCon (Dec. 29, 2015),  https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2015/12/
ftc-announces-agenda-privacycon [https://perma.cc/U6ZQ-CV32]. On the FTC’s role in 
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As noted above, the FTC’s capacity to serve as the U.S. 
privacy regulator is hampered by several jurisdictional carve-outs. 
In 1914, Congress largely exempted banks, common carriers, and 
not-for-profit institutions from the FTC’s oversight.57 The 
exempted sectors assemble, use, and transmit massive amounts of 
data about individuals, yet they stand beyond the FTC’s reach. It is 
difficult to envision the FTC serving as a truly effective national 
regulator of the consumer-facing elements of privacy policy if 
these exemptions persist. 
A variety of sectoral regulators occupy some of the policy 
terrain left open by the FTC’s jurisdictional exclusions. A notable 
example is the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), 
which exercises privacy oversight for telecommunications 
providers.58  The boundary between what is (and is not) a 
telecommunications service has shifted over time—and has moved 
dramatically in recent years, in the face of technological change, 
court decisions, and the FCC’s adoption (2016) and revocation 
(2017) of the “net neutrality” rule.59  By classifying broadband as a 
telecommunications service (bringing it within the ambit of the 
common carrier exemption), the FCC’s net neutrality rule would 
have ousted the FTC from privacy oversight in this technological 
space. The revocation of the net neutrality rule preserved the 
FTC’s role in this policy space. 
The FCC is not the only federal agency with sector-specific 
privacy oversight. The Department of Education enforces the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),60 which 
imposes record-disclosure duties and limits on educational 
institutions and state educational bodies that receive federal funds. 
The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) plays the 
 
convening events that provide fora for academics, advocacy groups, government 
officials, and practitioners to discuss privacy and other policy issues, see generally 
William E. Kovacic, The FTC as Convenor: Developing Regulatory Policy Norms 
without Litigation or Rulemaking, 13 COLO. TECH. L.J. 17 (2015). 
57 These jurisdictional limitations are described in Antitrust Law Developments, 
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N, 658–59 (7th ed. 2012). 
58 See HOOFNAGLE, supra note 8, at 335–37 (describing FCC’s role in privacy 
regulation). 
59 Ohm & Reid, supra note 22, at 1674–75, 1697–98. 
60 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2012). 
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lead role in enforcement of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (HIPAA),61 which established data privacy 
obligations and security requirements to safeguard medical 
information. 
Another notable participant in federal privacy policy 
implementation is the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ). The 
Department is responsible for enforcing a collection of criminal 
statutes, such as the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act,62 which fall 
within the general heading of cybersecurity.63  DOJ also has the 
power to enforce general anti-fraud provisions (e.g., statutes 
involving mail fraud and wire fraud) that can be used to attack 
such cyber-crimes as hacking and identify theft.64 
Consistent with our regulatory ecosystem theme, there have 
been numerous efforts to coordinate the work of these entities, in 
order to develop national privacy policy objectives and work with 
foreign governments to establish international policy norms. The 
FTC, the Department of Commerce, and various ad hoc bodies 
established by the Office of the President have all contributed to 
this broader policy development and coordination process. 
Finally, we note that our focus on consumer-facing privacy 
obscures the reality that multiple public entities collect information 
on citizens and residents of the U.S. Although we have already 
described the FTC as the “closest U.S. equivalent to a national 
privacy authority,” the FTC does not have the statutory authority to 
oversee the privacy practices of executive branch departments and 
agencies—and any attempt to give it that power would raise 
 
61 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-5 (2018). 
62 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 98-474, § 2,100 Stat. 1213-16 
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012)). 
63 See Patricia Bellia, A Code-Based Approach to Unauthorized Access Under the 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1442, 1443 (2016); see 
generally Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime’s Scope: Interpreting “Access” and “Authorization” 
in Computer Misuse Statues, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1596 (2003). The expanding significance 
of this area of enforcement is addressed in Why Everything is Hackable, ECONOMIST, 
Apr. 8, 2017, at 73. 
64 For example, DOJ plays a significant role in prosecuting instances of identity theft. 
See Combating Identity Theft: A Strategic Plan, PRESIDENT’S IDENTITY THEFT TASK 
FORCE 52–71 (2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports
/combating-identity-theft-strategic-plan/strategicplan.pdf [https://perma.cc/WUJ4-
WXY6]. 
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serious constitutional issues. Currently, many of these 
departments—including the Department of Justice and the 
Department of Homeland Security—have their own privacy 
offices.65 
State and Local Governments. State governments are 
prominent sources of U.S. privacy law.66  The states typically 
enforce their own laws through privacy units contained within the 
office of the state attorney general.67  Some enforcement functions 
are performed at the municipal level.68  In many instances, local 
police departments are the focal point for reports about identity 
theft, although they usually lack the authority or information 
sharing mechanisms to pursue these matters effectively.69 
Non-Government Organizations. Non-government 
organizations (NGOs) also play an important role in the creation of 
norms and in policy coordination. Academic institutions and 
professional societies (such as the American Association of 
Privacy Professionals) provide networks in which the full spectrum 
of groups with an interest in privacy policy (e.g., academics, 
companies, consumer advocates, consultancies, government 
officials, legislators and their staff members, and practitioners) 
meet to discuss privacy policy issues. 
Such meetings can help build consensus about the content and 
implementation of privacy policy. For this reason, NGOs are an 
important ingredient in the creation of privacy norms. These 
organizations also provide a forum in which policymakers can 
meet each other and discuss matters of common concern. These 
engagements supplement the more formal arrangements through 
 
65 See, e.g., Privacy, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. PRIVACY OFF., 
https://www.dhs.gov/topic/privacy [https://perma.cc/XR3S-H47M] (last visited Feb. 12, 
2019); Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/opcl 
[https://perma.cc/5YNH-AQLU] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019). 
66 See generally Citron, supra note 9 (comprehensively examining the framework of 
state controls). 
67 See generally id. (describing such mechanisms).  
68 See generally id.   
69 See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S IDENTITY THEFT TASK FORCE, supra note 64, at 40–41 
(describing measures to enhance cooperation across federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies to share information about instances of identity theft and to 
facilitate prosecution). 
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which public officials discuss shared or collateral responsibilities. 
The academic institutions and professional societies also function 
as educational hubs through which the U.S. privacy community 
and its foreign counterparts meet to learn about international 
developments. In combination, these interactions help crystallize 
shared understandings about the substance and process of privacy 
norms that can inform the development of international standards. 
II. U.S. PRIVACY LAW IMPLEMENTATION INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: 
SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES 
We approach the question of institutional design for privacy 
policy implementation from two perspectives. First, what 
considerations should guide the design of the system as a whole?  
Second, what criteria should inform the allocation of tasks to 
specific institutions within the larger system framework? 
A. System-wide Design Criteria 
U.S. privacy policy implementation should satisfy five basic 
criteria: policy coherence, well-defined lines of authority, cost-
minimization, adaptability, and diversification. 
Policy Coherence. The implementation framework should 
foster the development of clear and consistent commands. Affected 
operators should not to have to reconcile conflicting obligations 
with respect to the same activity. Similarly situated operators 
should be subject to the same obligations. Industry-specific 
variations should be justified by the distinctive needs of the sector. 
And individual regulators should be attuned to the spillover effects 
of their own decisions upon other regulators and other industries. 
Well-Defined Lines of Authority. Affected operators, citizens, 
and foreign data protection officials should have a clear view of 
the responsibilities of each implementation institution. 
Cost-Minimization. Regulatory objectives should be achieved 
at the lowest possible cost to operators and citizens—meaning that 
needless institutional complexity should be avoided. 
Adaptability. The regulatory system should be designed so it 
can adapt to changing conditions, including the ability to address 
new phenomena and technological developments. To do so, the 
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system should have the resources and policy tools to stay abreast 
of new developments and reasonably elastic mandates—for 
example, by rulemaking—to adjust legal commands over time.70 
Diversification. Overlapping or parallel authority can serve as a 
useful safeguard against failure by any single institution and can 
facilitate policy experimentation that produces good solutions to 
new problems.71 
We note that tensions inevitably arise among these goals. For 
example, the diversification that can promote useful 
experimentation and adaptability can come at the cost of system-
wide coherence (more regulators taking different approaches to 
solving the same problem) and greater administrative costs. The 
purpose of focusing on these criteria is to recognize design 
tradeoffs and identify areas for possible improvement. 
B. Allocation of Regulatory Tasks 
Based on our prior work, we offer seven criteria that should 
guide the assignment of regulatory responsibility to governmental 
agencies.72 
Policy Coherence. At the agency level, one must ask whether a 
privacy mandate fits within the agency’s existing portfolio of 
duties. The issue is relatively simple when privacy is the agency’s 
only responsibility—but that really does not apply to our current 
regulatory framework. The key participants in privacy regulation—
the DOJ, the FCC, the FTC, and state attorneys general—all have 
diversified mandates. The wisdom of placing privacy within a 
multi-function agency—or giving a privacy role to an agency that 
presently does something else—depends principally on whether 
privacy and the other functions are policy complements rather than 
policy substitutes.73 
 
70 See Ric Simmons, The Failure of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: Time to Take 
an Administrative Approach to Regulating Computer Crime, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1703, 1714–22 (2016) (discussing how administrative agencies can use rulemaking and 
other policy tools to adapt to changing conditions). 
71 See generally Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 6. 
72 See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1468–83. 
73 See id. 
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Branding and Credibility. Agencies develop reputations or 
“brands” that convey information about their aims and 
effectiveness. A good brand is an asset when the agency appears 
before other governmental bodies (e.g., courts or legislatures), 
deals with affected operators, or interacts with foreign authorities. 
The assignment of unrelated functions to an agency can diminish 
its brand, even if the functions are not policy substitutes. Excessive 
diversification can reduce the agency’s ability to define its role 
clearly and to build a reputation for competence and effectiveness. 
Capability and Capacity. Capability refers to whether the 
agency has the statutory powers, organizational structure, and 
processes to perform its assigned role effectively. Capacity focuses 
on whether the agency has the resources—human capital and 
physical infrastructure—to fulfill its responsibilities. Legislators 
routinely give regulators too little power and too few resources to 
meet the goals set out in the law. Some degree of mismatch 
between ends and means is inevitable, but serious imbalances will 
cause policy failures. 
Adaptability. Regulators must be able to adapt to technological 
development and other unforeseen circumstances. In many 
respects, adaptability is a function of the agency’s capability (grant 
of authority) and its capacity (human and physical resources). 
Internal Cohesion. A major determinant of agency 
effectiveness is the successful integration of its internal operating 
units.74 For a single-purpose agency with law enforcement duties, 
this requires joining up the work of case-handling teams, the 
general counsel’s office, and other relevant operating units. For a 
body with a multi-member governance system, the attainment of 
internal cohesion also involves the formulation, to the greatest 
extent possible, of a common vision on the part of board members 
and the development of techniques for communicating that vision 
inside and outside the agency. For a multi-function agency, 
 
74 See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Intra-Agency Coordination, 129 HARV. L. REV. 421, 429 
(2015). See also Bijal Shah, Toward an Intra-Agency Separation of Powers, 92 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 101 (2017); Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: 
An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2017); 
Daniel Carpenter, Internal Governance of Agencies: The Sieve, the Shove, the Show, 129 
HARV. L. REV. F. 189, 192 (2016). 
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internal cohesion requires mechanisms to ensure that conceptual 
policy synergies are realized in practice. 
Relationship to the Larger Regulatory Ecosystem. In many 
settings, two or more public agencies exercise the same or related 
policy making duties or law enforcement functions.75  The 
assignment of concurrent or parallel authority to two or more 
institutions is usually a source of tension, as the relevant agencies 
understandably regard one another as rivals rather than partners. 
Despite antagonisms, agencies recognize the need for 
cooperation and develop a range of mechanisms, some formal 
(e.g., the execution of an interagency memorandum of 
understanding) and some informal (e.g., regular discussions among 
agency leaders and case-handlers), to achieve policy coherence 
across the system and reduce conflict. Decisions about whether to 
move policy functions from one agency to another, or to situate 
new duties in an existing agency, should be undertaken with 
awareness of these policy synapses. 
Political Support. The effectiveness of a design for a single 
institution requires that the design be politically sustainable. Does 
the agency’s substantive mandate and organization enable it to 
gain the assent of elected officials (e.g., in the form of adequate 
appropriations) for the successful performance of its duties?  The 
decision in Dodd-Frank to insulate the new Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau (CFPB) so extensively from political 
interference reflected the belief that only a truly autonomous 
regulator would take bold action to avoid another collapse of the 
financial system.76  Yet the full collection of safeguards—notably 
governance by a single director appointed for a fixed term and 
funding through fees collected by the Federal Reserve Board—has 
exposed the new institution to assault in the courts and in Congress 
about whether it has the necessary degree of accountability.77 
 
75 See Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1454–60 (collecting examples of shared 
policymaking functions). 
76 See Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Financial Service Industry’s Misguided Quest to 
Undermine the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 881, 
884 (2012). 
77 See generally PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc). See also 
Hyman & Kovacic, supra note 16, at 1504–08. 
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If political support for an agency is absent entirely, or exists 
but only on a partisan basis, there will be concrete consequences 
for the perceived legitimacy of the agency. It is not an accident that 
President Trump named an individual to head the CFPB (OMB 
Director Mick Mulvaney) who had previously stated that the 
agency was a “joke, in a sick, sad kind of way” and had co-
sponsored legislation that would have eliminated the CFPB.78  Nor 
was it an accident that the CFPB was the only agency in the federal 
government at which there was a lawsuit over who was actually in 
charge of the bureau—with the (ultimately unsuccessful) claims to 
the throne by Leandra English, the just-named Deputy Director of 
the CFPB, enthusiastically backed by Congressional Democrats, 
and dismissed or ignored by Republicans.79 
III. APPLYING OUR CRITERIA: WHO SHOULD DO WHAT? 
Any overhaul of substantive privacy policy should be 
accompanied by a reexamination of the framework of 
implementing institutions. Even if we do not overhaul substantive 
privacy policy, it is past time for the institutional arrangements 
through which privacy policy is developed and administered to be 
overhauled as well. Measured by the criteria set out in Section III, 
the U.S. regime for implementing privacy policy has serious 
weaknesses. Perhaps the most noteworthy weakness is a lack of 
coherence. The heavy reliance on an accumulation of sector-
specific and activity-specific statutory measures has established a 
mosaic that contains potent controls but lacks unifying principles 
and has important gaps. The FTC has used its UDAP authority to 
 
78 See Abigail Tracy, What the Hell is Going on at the CFPB?, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 27, 
2017),  https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/11/donald-trump-mick-mulvaney-
consumer-finance-protection-bureau [https://perma.cc/L5FE-3E7F]; Gillian B. White, 
The Dismal Future of Trump’s Least Favorite Agency, ATLANTIC (Nov. 17, 2017),  
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/11/cfpb-mulvaney-trump/546131/ 
[https://perma.cc/8G57-VWR2]. 
79 Tracy, supra note 77. See also Doyle McManus, It’s High Noon at the CFPB, L.A. 
TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), http://beta.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-mcmanus-cfpb-
elizabeth-warren-trump-20171129-story.html [https://perma.cc/6KZ6-2SS2]; Kelsey 
Tamborrino, Graham, Durbin Disagree on New CFPB Director, POLITICO (Nov. 26, 
2017), https://www.politico.com/story/2017/11/26/graham-durbin-consumer-protection-
agency-259969 [https://perma.cc/L7WF-73VN]. 
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fill some of the gaps, but the agency’s jurisdictional limitations are 
a serious disability. Coherence also suffers from the ability of 
individual regulators—state and federal—to establish new 
interpretations or requirements without the need to coordinate their 
choices with other regulators or to consider the impact of new 
initiatives on the larger ecosystem of privacy regulation. 
The fragmentation of responsibility for domestic privacy policy 
also denies the U.S. coherence and credibility in the eyes of its 
foreign counterparts. In our experience, some foreign privacy 
regulators downgrade the U.S. privacy regime on substantive 
grounds, often pointing to the lack of an omnibus statutory 
foundation with universal applicability. Others score the U.S. 
system poorly for the absence of a simplified implementation 
framework overseen by a single national privacy regulator. Most 
foreign privacy regulators have doubts about the benefits of 
simultaneous federal and state-level enforcement in the absence of 
clearly delegated lines of authority. Simplification of the U.S. 
privacy regime, anchored by the establishment of a national 
privacy regulator and clarification of zones of authority among the 
various regulators, would give the U.S. more influence in global 
privacy policymaking.80 
What might such a simplified, clarified framework look like?  
There are a number of possible approaches for ordering the 
relationship of public agencies in policy domains occupied by 
multiple authorities.81 For the national privacy authority, we focus 
on two distinct options. One approach is to enhance the powers of 
the Federal Trade Commission, which, as noted above, is the 
closest equivalent to a U.S. national privacy agency.82  The other 
approach is to create a new free-standing national privacy agency. 
We consider each of these strategies in turn. 
 
80 See Gellman, supra note 9, at 1187 (“[W]ith the international critical mass of data 
protection agencies that now exists, a country without an agency is at a disadvantage.”). 
81 See Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, Functional Government in 3-D: 
A Framework for Evaluating Allocations of Government, 51 HARV. J. LEGIS. 19, 21 
(2014). 
82 See supra text accompanying note 8. See also Hartzog & Solove, supra note 3, at 
2294–300; Solove & Hoofnagle, supra note 4, at 368–82 (proposing that the FTC, using 
its existing grants of authority, could expand its role in developing coherent nationwide 
privacy standards). 
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A. Enhanced FTC as National Privacy Regulator 
Under the first option, Congress would eliminate the FTC’s 
jurisdictional limitations and give it the authority to enforce 
privacy across the board—including against not-for-profit 
institutions. Other government agencies (e.g., the Department of 
Health and Human Services) would retain concurrent powers to 
enforce privacy laws, but only pursuant to rules and other guidance 
set by the FTC, and under a regular process of consultation 
involving the FTC and its federal counterparts. Such a concurrency 
regime could be modeled along the lines of the United Kingdom’s 
competition policy framework by which the Competition and 
Markets Authority (CMA) and sectoral regulators such as OFGEN 
and OFCOM share authority for the enforcement of the nation’s 
competition laws. The CMA and the sectoral regulators engage in 
regular consultations through the United Kingdom Competition 
Network (UKCN), which serves to coordinate competition policy 
implementation and ensure cooperation in the application of the 
CMA’s law enforcement and other policymaking tools. 
The case for making an enhanced FTC the national privacy 
regulator is straightforward. Of all U.S. privacy implementation 
institutions, the FTC has unequaled capacity in the form of expert 
case handling and policy teams and physical resources (including 
the development, over the past decade, of an internet laboratory to 
do high-quality forensic work, and the hiring of technology experts 
to assist in that effort). The agency’s capacity also is the product of 
extensive experience in applying its UDAP authority and enforcing 
statutes such as the FCRA and COPPA. The FTC has a broad 
portfolio of policy instruments (litigation, rulemaking, consumer 
and business education, data collection, the preparation of reports, 
the convening of conferences), and it has demonstrated its ability 
to use all of them to good effect in the privacy domain. The FTC’s 
stature as an independent agency gives it additional credibility in 
the eyes of foreign officials, who generally distrust the vesting of 
privacy powers in an executive department. 
Within an enhanced FTC, privacy policy implementation also 
would be informed by the Commission’s larger experience with 
consumer protection. The FTC’s privacy unit is one part of its 
Bureau of Consumer Protection, rather than being a self-contained 
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bureau. This reflected the institution’s reasonable view that the 
effort to safeguard consumer interests in “privacy” was one 
dimension of “consumer protection,” rather than a wholly distinct 
policy realm. Our impression is that many matters that involve 
privacy issues also raise problems that fit within other areas of the 
FTC’s consumer protection program. The analysis of the “privacy” 
issue often benefits from perspectives developed in the course of 
applying the agency’s deception and unfairness authority in other 
cases. The intertwining of privacy issues with other consumer 
protection concerns in many scenarios has important implications 
for how the mandate of a privacy agency should be defined. In 
whatever setting one ultimately might place a “privacy” mandate, 
we would expect that the host agency would have a mandate that 
incorporates powers that traditionally have been associated with 
the FTC’s broader consumer protection program.83 
The FTC’s expertise in antitrust should also help it develop and 
enforce privacy policy. Enforcing antitrust law has given the FTC 
ongoing involvement in multiple high-tech markets—as well as an 
understanding of how competition can motivate companies to offer 
better privacy protections. The FTC’s work in both consumer 
protection and antitrust draws upon a Bureau of Economics with 
over 80 PhDs in economics.84 The Bureau of Economics has 
developed considerable skill in sub-disciplines (including 
behavioral economics) with special application to privacy issues. 
Of course, inputs are not the same thing as outputs. The FTC 
has not always achieved the full integration of perspectives that the 
combination of these institutional capacities would permit. And, 
although there are policy complementarities across the domains of 
antitrust, consumer protection, and privacy, this combination of 
functions is not an unmixed blessing. An agency with all three 
functions might seek to use its position as a gatekeeper with 
respect to one policy domain to leverage concessions from firms 
 
83 The interconnections between the domains of privacy law and consumer protection 
law are explored in one context in Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 995, 1043 (2014). 
84 See Paul A. Pautler, A History of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics 136 (Am. 
Antitrust Inst., Working Paper No. 15-03, 2015) (reporting that, as of 2012, the FTC had 
eighty-two economists with doctorates in economics). 
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over which it exercises oversight in another domain.85 Such 
temptations have been present when the FTC has applied its 
antitrust powers to review mergers involving companies in the 
information services sector.86 
Finally, there is the possibility that any one of these functions 
might be diminished if all three are contained in the same agency. 
An agency focused solely on privacy will make privacy policy its 
single concern. An agency responsible for antitrust, consumer 
protection, and privacy is likely to find itself making tradeoffs as it 
sets priorities for how to use its resources. 
Giving the FTC an expanded privacy role is likely to prompt 
reevaluation of the FTC’s portfolio. More privacy powers (and a 
larger privacy budget) would make antitrust a comparatively 
smaller element of the FTC’s program. In the FTC’s budget 
request to Congress for Fiscal Year 2019, the funds proposed for 
consumer protection (including privacy) functions constituted 
nearly fifty-four percent of the agency’s budget.87 An expanded 
privacy role would reduce the overall percentage of resources 
devoted to antitrust policy still further. Any augmentation of the 
FTC’s privacy role could well trigger a larger debate about 
whether the FTC should retain its antitrust mandate, or instead 
divest its antitrust functions to the Antitrust Division of the DOJ. 
Similar questions would arise if Congress dissolved the CFPB 
and assigned its duties to the FTC. From Fiscal Year 2010 through 
Fiscal Year 2017, the FTC’s headcount ranged between 1132 and 
1165; the CFPB’s is roughly 1800.88 Even if the FTC absorbed 
 
85 See William E. Kovacic & David A. Hyman, Regulatory Leveraging: Problem or 
Solution?, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1163, 1168 (2016). 
86 See Maureen K. Ohlhausen & Alexander P. Okuliar, Competition, Consumer 
Protection, and the Right [Approach] to Privacy, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 121, 123 (2015). 
87 Fiscal Year 2019 Congressional Budget Justification, 2 FED. TRADE COMM’N  
(2018), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/fy-2019-congressional-budget-justification [https://
perma.cc/BS6F-25JM]. 
88 On the FTC’s data, see FTC Appropriation and Full-Time Equivalent (FTE) 
History, FED. TRADE COMM’N (2018), https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices/office-executive-director/financial-management-office/ftc-appropriation 
[https://perma.cc/73DM-QXM4]. The CFPB’s FTE headcount estimate for Fiscal Year 
2018 was 1792. See The CFPB Strategic Plan, Budget, and Performance Plan and 
Report, 11–12 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (2017), 
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only half of the CFPB’s employees, the share of agency resources 
dedicated to antitrust would fall to under a third of the agency’s 
budget—posing the same question about whether an agency whose 
duties are so heavily weighted toward consumer protection should 
retain antitrust responsibilities. 
If this path is followed, the long-term result of making the FTC 
the nation’s top privacy cop may transform the agency into a 
consumer protection/privacy regulator, rather than a consumer 
protection/antitrust regulator. Reasonable people can disagree on 
whether that transformation is a net positive development. 
From an international relations perspective, an enhanced FTC 
would be a more effective participant in policy discussions and 
deliberations on privacy standards. With the jurisdictional 
loopholes closed, the FTC could properly claim to speak with 
respect to all matters affecting consumer-facing privacy in the U.S. 
The FTC’s status as an independent agency also gives it sufficient 
distance from the executive branch—avoiding concerns that would 
otherwise be inevitable if the U.S. data protection authority were 
an executive department. 
B. A New National Privacy Regulator 
The second option for creating a national privacy regulator 
would be for the FTC to spin off its privacy functions to a newly 
formed commission, which also might absorb the privacy-related 
functions of other federal bodies.89 Compared to a multi-function 
agency, an independent, privacy-only commission would have 
internal policy cohesion and greater ability to develop a well-
 
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201705_cfpb_report_strategic-plan-budget-
and-performance-plan_FY2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/HX2T-6W2G].  
89 This would not be the first time that the FTC served as an incubator for a new 
federal institution. The FTC performed this role in the creation of the Securities 
Exchange Commission in the 1930s. Similarly, the establishment of the Consumer 
Product Safety Commission in the 1970s and the CFPB both involved the absorption of 
programs developed within the FTC. For an early proposal to create a new free-standing 
privacy agency, see JAY STANLEY, ACLU, ENFORCING PRIVACY: BUILDING AMERICAN 
INSTITUTIONS TO PROTECT PRIVACY IN THE FACE OF NEW TECHNOLOGY AND GOVERNMENT 
POWERS (2009), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/ACLU_Report_-_Enforcing_Privacy
_2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP4V-JPC9]. 
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understood policy brand.90 It would also be less subject to the path-
dependent constraints that would inevitably be associated with 
turning all consumer-facing privacy matters over to an enhanced 
FTC. 
These conditions potentially would improve the agency’s 
ability to function effectively within the U.S. and to engage with 
foreign authorities, who no longer would have concerns that the 
U.S. regulator’s privacy program was diluted by attention to non-
privacy policy duties. This cohesiveness and clarity would come at 
the cost of losing connection to relevant experience assembled in 
the fulfillment of the FTC’s antitrust and consumer protection 
missions. On the other hand, the powers of the new institution 
could be defined in a way that enables the agency to address 
privacy issues with consumer protection powers akin to those now 
exercised by the FTC. 
The independent privacy agency also would be untethered from 
the discipline provided by the work of the FTC’s Bureau of 
Economics, which has pushed the FTC’s antitrust and consumer 
protection lawyers to apply economic analysis in the development 
of cases and rules. Of course, it would be possible to give the new 
privacy agency a similar analytical capacity. As with the FTC, the 
actual application of that capability would depend heavily on the 
training and preferences of the new agency’s leadership. One 
function we would expect the FTC or a new stand-alone privacy 
agency to perform is to evaluate the effects of individual privacy 
initiatives at the federal and state levels, and periodically to assess 
the impact of the U.S. privacy system as a whole. 
In setting out this option, we recognize all of the difficulties 
that arise in the creation of a new institution that absorbs many of 
its functions and personnel from other agencies. No one should 
underestimate the lost productivity that occurs during the period of 
transition. Nor can one ignore the costs of knitting new functions 
and personnel into a new institution. Bringing a variety of 
disparate mandates and teams under a single roof does not mean 
 
90 But see Yoon-Ho Alex Lee, Beyond Agency Core Mission, 68 ADMIN. L. REV. 551, 
593–603 (2016) (discussing approaches that can enable an agency to effectively perform 
policy functions that lie beyond what might be considered to be its “core mission”). 
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that they automatically will function as an integrated whole. These 
changes are the equivalent of major surgery, and recovery time for 
the new organization can be substantial. 
C. Suggested Approach 
We suggest the adoption of the first approach set out above: the 
FTC should become the principal U.S. data protection authority for 
consumer-facing privacy matters. A necessary legislative 
foundation for this approach would involve (a) eliminating the 
jurisdictional exclusions from the FTC’s mandate, (b) giving the 
FTC concurrent enforcement authority with respect to all 
consumer-facing federal statutes, and (c) giving the FTC an 
express mandate to coordinate national privacy policy. 
This approach would not divest other government agencies of 
the privacy policy functions they now perform, nor would it 
involve the FTC’s absorption of staff now resident in other 
government agencies. Other governmental institutions will 
continue to have important privacy responsibilities. The DOJ will 
retain an important role, prosecuting cybercrimes and other grave 
infringements of privacy laws. The Department of Commerce and 
the other ad hoc bodies within the Office of the President will 
continue to be active in the privacy space, given the prominence of 
privacy issues in domestic economic policy, in international trade 
negotiations, and in foreign relations generally.91 And, as noted 
previously, our proposal only covers consumer-facing privacy 
regulation—leaving in place the existing infrastructure for all other 
matters. 
What about the states? Some commentators have argued that a 
full-scale renovation of the U.S. privacy framework should 
preempt the ability of states to pursue initiatives inconsistent with 
national policy.92  We think an alternative pathway holds greater 
promise. Federal and state privacy regulators currently cooperate 
in a variety of ways, but there is no systematic mechanism for 
policy coordination or convergence on shared norms. We propose 
 
91 See generally Swire, Privacy Policy Office, supra note 9.  
92 Citron, supra note 9, at 798–803 (discussing the debate over preemption of the 
states’ role in privacy policy). See generally Robert A. Mikos, Making Preemption Less 
Palatable: State Poison Pill Legislation, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (2017). 
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the extension of existing cooperation and coordination efforts 
through the establishment of a domestic privacy network (DPN)—
analogous to the International Competition Network for antitrust 
enforcers.93 A DPN will help encourage privacy regulators within 
the U.S. to converge on superior policy norms. 
Among other tasks, the DPN could use the accumulated 
experience of state regulators to devise model laws—for example, 
a law dealing with data breaches—that will provide focal points for 
convergence. Here the DPN would play a role akin to that 
performed by American Law Institute and the National Council of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.94 
From a theoretical perspective, one can improve the 
institutional framework for U.S. privacy policy either by merger 
(i.e., by placing all relevant functions within a single institution) or 
by contract (i.e., by creating and strengthening the ties that allow 
existing entities to better coordinate their efforts). Our 
“integration-by-contract” approach involves greater costs of 
coordination, but it has several major benefits. Most importantly, it 
avoids the disruption that takes place when responsibilities and 
personnel are reallocated across agencies. We believe that 
reorganizations are difficult to justify unless the benefits are 
compelling. As a practical matter, reorganization proposals also 
face daunting political headwinds, since they disrupt settled 
practices and expectations (including the flow of campaign 
contributions to members of Congress). 
CONCLUSION 
For nearly two decades, a growing collection of commentators 
has called for fundamental reform of the U.S. privacy regime.95 
Recent developments—including the implementation of the 
 
93 For a discussion of the possible creation of such a network to deal with competition 
law, see William E. Kovacic, Toward a Domestic Competition Network, in COMPETITION 
LAWS IN CONFLICT 316–17 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004). 
94 Cf. Daniel J. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent 
Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1880, 1903 (2013) (using the UCC analogy to discuss the 
development and broad adoption of privacy norms). 
95 See supra note 4, and accompanying text. 
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GDPR,96 and disclosures about apparent lapses in data protection 
by leading information services firms97—may be creating a 
political environment in which Congress undertakes a basic 
redesign of U.S. privacy law. Concerns about the adequacy of the 
U.S. privacy system have led the leaders of major American high 
technology firms to call for adoption of a new omnibus U.S. law 
that resembles the GDPR.98 
Should these developments catalyze basic change, 
improvements in U.S. privacy policy will require as much attention 
to implementation as it does to the appropriate content of 
substantive privacy standards. Currently, domestic privacy 
policymaking and enforcement are fragmented. This state of affairs 
precludes policy coherence at home and diminishes the influence 
of the U.S. in international deliberations about global privacy 
norms. 
We offer two options for the development of a next-generation 
national privacy regulator: the enhancement of the powers and role 
of the FTC or the creation of a new, independent privacy 
commission whose core would consist of privacy functions 
previously performed by the FTC. In addition, we suggest the 
creation of a policy network that links implementation at the 
federal and state levels. Although we believe the former solution 
(enhanced FTC) is better than the latter solution (new privacy 
regulator), either solution would be an improvement on the status 
quo. 
 
96 See supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text. 
97 See, e.g., Kadhim Shubber, Facebook Leak Puts US Regulator’s Reputation in Play, 
FIN. TIMES (Apr. 3, 2018), https://www.ft.com/content/bcc01464-36c1-11e8-8b98-
2f31af407cc8 [https://perma.cc/96GQ-XV25] (discussing revelations suggesting that 
Facebook may have violated the terms of a data protection settlement reached with the 
FTC in 2011–2012). 
98 See, e.g., Tim Cook Calls for US Federal Privacy Law to Tackle ‘Weaponized’ 
Personal Data, GUARDIAN (Oct. 24, 2018, 2:24 PM), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2018/oct/24/tim-cook-us-federal-privacy-law-weaponized-personal-data 
[https://perma.cc/UD7W-2F3B]. 
